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INTRODUCTION 
Middle East scholars have consistently cautioned against an intellectual gulf dividing 
International Relations (IR) theory and the study of international relations of the Middle East 
(IRME). Noting a lack of cross-fertilization between IR theories and region-focused analyses, 
many have highlighted the necessity to move beyond the “Area Studies Controversy” in 
favour of dialogue between IR Theory and Middle Eastern Studies.1 Theoretical approaches 
applied to IRME have increasingly crossed this schism, bridging IR theories with the study of 
the region’s particularities and complexities.2 The last three decades provide numerous 
outstanding, sophisticated work that combined IR theories and in-depth knowledge of 
regional affairs to propose a modified IR theory applied to the Middle East. Whereas some 
have contextualized mainstream IR approaches to fit the alleged exceptional regional 
characteristics,3 others have adopted a disciplinary eclecticism combining insights from 
several approaches to capture the region’s political dynamics.4 Despite difference in ways to 
engage IR theory, most IRME scholarship includes the domestic sphere as the primary 
corrective strategy to attain a “valid” IR theory applied to the region. Middle East scholars 
agree that states in the region developed as fragmented, unstable, and vulnerable to 
transnational forces, what Salloukh called ‘state permeability’.5 Due to this persistent 
weakness, states in the region cannot be approached as unitary actors;6 domestic politics are 
at the center of IRME. 
This ontological position within contemporary IRME work converges with the turn to 
decision-making and domestic politics that has occurred over the last 25 years in IR Theory. 
This domestic turn in IR, however, often lacks theoretical development and makes 
assumptions that can be challenged by research in foreign policy analysis (FPA), with its focus 
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on agents for understanding international politics. FPA considers the role of decision-making 
units to be central, where leaders (decision makers) subjectively interpret international and 
domestic factors. Despite the centrality of domestic politics in IRME, this scholarship generally 
ignores work in FPA, particularly FPA’s psychological and agent orientation. This constitutes a 
missed opportunity for the study of the region. We propose that FPA offers an analytical 
framework, a research agenda, and an ontological stance that allows fruitful development of 
domestic politics in IRME scholarship. 
This article develops a critical analysis of the domestic politics orientation in IRME 
while situating it within broader theoretical developments in the IR discipline. The aim of this 
article is not to offer a single foreign policy theory for IRME that is alternative to existing 
theoretical frameworks. Instead, it is a meta-theoretical contribution with the intent of 
developing theoretical understanding of IRME. We argue that the incorporation of domestic 
factors in the study of IRME has not led to clear and sustained theoretical progress and that 
a serious engagement with an FPA perspective — conceptually rich in its understanding of 
how domestic politics influences foreign policy — can increase the comparative value of 
research conducted by Middle East scholars within the IR discipline. We draw on Kaarbo’s 
promise that an FPA perspective can offer an “integrating crucible for the cross-theoretical 
turn toward domestic politics and decision making in IR theory” and illustrate the value of 
such exercise at a regional level.7 
We begin by defining FPA as a subfield and a distinct perspective in IR. We then 
examine how domestic factors have been integrated within IRME, focusing on realist-based 
approaches and constructivism. Within each of these theoretical perspectives, we explore 
how FPA research defies or develops the integration of domestic and decision-making factors 
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with IRME. The last section suggests four avenues of research for incorporating FPA research 
into IRME: an understanding of public opinion’s influence based on the distribution of 
information, the decision unit framework, leadership style, and role theory. This section 
shows that an FPA perspective offers an alternative and complementary approach to the 
additive and eclectic frameworks predominant in IRME scholarship.  
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A DISTINCT PERSPECTIVE 
Domestic politics and decision-making processes have historically not been at the centre of 
most IR theory. Instead, structural explanations of IR and foreign policies have dominated 
research on international politics. From the neorealist focus on anarchy and power 
distribution to liberalism’s expectations8 on constraining factors of economic interdependent 
structures and international regimes, foreign policy is understood as reactions to external 
pressures faced by states.9 Constructivism also focuses on role and normative structures to 
explain state behaviour according to logics of appropriateness and constructed narratives of 
self and other.10 
 IR theory has, however, developed over the last 25 years to incorporate domestic 
political and decision-making factors.11 Neoclassical realism, variants of liberalism and 
constructivism have integrated state motives, perceptions, public opinion, and political 
culture.  IR has moved away from the argument that IR theory is only about general patterns 
of international politics, not discreet foreign policy behaviours.12 This promising turn, 
nevertheless, ignores FPA research, despite FPA’s central concern with examining “inside the 
black box” of states to explain foreign policy.13 FPA, as subfield of IR, emerged in the 1950s 
and focuses on the role of psychological factors, institutional policy-making processes, and 
public opinion in foreign policy. FPA offers a distinct perspective, with its “actor-specific focus, 
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based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded 
in human decision makers acting singly or in groups”.14 The agent decision maker is at the 
centre of state behaviour and constitutes the core contribution of FPA. Decision makers’ response 
to domestic and international environments is subject to a number of factors: psychological, 
societal, ideational, political, institutional, and material.  
FPA is not a single theory — but neither is constructivism, or realism, for example. But 
FPA does propose a distinct starting point for explaining international relations in which 
leaders’ subjective understandings filter the influence of all other international and domestic, 
institutional and societal factors. Key areas of FPA research are “(i) individual- and small- 
group-level psychological factors in foreign policy decision making, (ii) variation in 
institutional decision-making processes, and (iii) elite-mass relations”.15 The incorporation of 
domestic politics and decisionmaking in IR theories has missed the opportunity to build on 
FPA research, broadly defined as a subfield or narrowly defined as a perspective. IRME 
scholarship has similarly missed this opportunity and, like IR theory, remains disconnected 
with FPA, despite common ground.  
THE FPA-IRME DISCONNECT 
Middle East scholars have noted a disconnect between IRME and FPA. Korany and Dessouki 
observe that mainstream approaches in IRME favor the macro level in international relations 
at the detriment of unit-based analyses.16  There are some exceptions, such as Hinnebusch 
and Ehteshami’s The Foreign Policies of Middle East States,17 informed by FPA.18 Yet, IRME 
scholars tend toward ad hoc eclecticism in incorporating domestic and decision-making 
variables to their adapted-IR approaches to the Middle East. Scholars have often adopted 
various eclectic frameworks blending several elements and an expanding list of domestic 
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causal factors. These frameworks lacked discernable mechanisms within causal stories as 
opposed to the more conscious effort of analytical eclecticism within IR.19 Despite the 
richness that eclecticism provides in explaining real-world issues, this approach further 
isolated IRME from mainstream IR approaches. Moreover, the dialogue between IR and the 
Middle East has been unidimensional where the interchange was limited to theory testing, 
application, and adaptation to produce sophisticated and complex analyses of various 
regional phenomena. In general, the Middle East remains absent from IR theory building 
efforts. 
This section examines the role of domestic factors in mainstream IR approaches that 
were modified, then applied, to the Middle East. Although our argument about the disconnect 
between IRME and FPA may apply to other perspectives used in IRME (such as Historical 
Sociology,20 the English School,21 post-colonial studies,22 and critical security approaches23), 
our scope here is limited to research developed within realism and constructivism. Within 
each perspective, we explore various ways domestic factors were incorporated and how 
research within FPA can inform and develop this research. We propose that FPA, as a 
perspective offering both complementary and alternative lens to IR theory, provides an 
important added value to the integration of domestic factors in IRME scholarship. 
Realism 
One of the distinguishing features of Middle East politics is the high degree of militarization 
and recurrence of interstate conflicts. The Middle East thus appears to be the region where 
realism retains significant relevance. Realism is primarily based on the assumption that states 
are unitary actors advancing their interest and power amidst the anarchy of the international 
system. In its neorealist version, the anarchy-induced insecurity of states is the determinant 
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driver of state behavior. A classic theoretically-informed neorealist analysis of IRME is 
Stephen Walt’s The Origins of Alliances.24  Although Walt acknowledges that domestic 
concerns can drive alliances, his analysis focused on structural dimensions of regional alliance-
making and subjective dimensions in his study were left untheorized. As Goldgeir25 notes, 
“Walt argues for the importance of perceptions, beliefs, motivations, and bias while leaving 
the origins of these factors to case-by-case empirical study rather than systematic theoretical 
investigation”.26 
 IRME scholars have considered neorealist structural analysis as “necessary, but not 
sufficient” 27 and challenged its assumptions from several angles, leading to two major strands 
in the adaption of neorealism to IRME. The first strand is the regime security approach that 
challenges the neorealist characterisation of states as unitary cohesive units and argues that 
state behaviour is contingent upon elites or regimes in power. The second strand evolves from 
the neoclassical realist approach (NCR). While maintaining the primacy of structural factors, 
NCR includes domestic factors that shape states’ reactions to systemic pressures and 
opportunities. While both approaches have similarities to FPA, an FPA perspective would 
challenge some of their assumptions and question how domestic and especially decision-
making factors are treated. 
 The regime security approach offers a corrective reading of inter-Arab politics as the 
result of regimes’ quest for survival. Upon a closer look at the particularities of the state 
system in the Middle East, this approach argues that statehood and sovereignty do not yet 
conform with Weberian notions of statehood. From this perspective, the core unit of analysis 
is the “regime”, that is a centralised authoritarian rule in the hands of a ruling elite or a leader. 
Regime security is, hence, defined as the maintenance of power by ruling leaders or elites.28 
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The logic of regime survival is at the forefront of any foreign policy decision, where leaders 
are at the intersection of domestic and structural levels of analysis. Regimes’ foreign policy 
decisions are often driven by internal and external threats to their survival.29 Regime survival 
explanations complement structural analysis by adding domestic factors, such as legitimacy, 
economics, ideology, state-society relations, leaders’ perceptions, and state-building 
imperatives. Examples include Hinnebusch and Ehteshami’s framework of “complex 
realism”.30 They argue that while state behavior is often driven by external threats to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, also relevant are domestic factors, such as the level of 
state formation, foreign policy role, regime-society relations, and idiosyncrasies of leaders. 
Telhami’s analysis of the origins of the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is another attempt 
at integrating realist explanations with variables from psychological analyses of leaders’ 
personalities.31 
 Other scholars consider domestic factors to be predominant in shaping state behavior. 
Gause argues that Middle East regimes give higher priority to internal over external threats.32 
Harknett and VanDenBerg’s analysis of Jordanian alliances during the 1991 Gulf War 
demonstrates that foreign policy is a reaction to interrelated external and internal 
challenges.33 Telhami combines realist theories of alliances with the notion of legitimacy to 
account for Arab regimes’ alliance decisions.34 He claims that threats are constituted by 
transnational symbols of legitimacy in the Arab world. Rubin’s framework of “ideational 
balancing” also examines regime security as the result of interaction among states, between 
state and society, and between a foreign state and another state’s society.35 Other scholars 
examine domestic economic capabilities as determinant of alliance behavior.36  
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 Alongside the regime security approach, some IRME scholarship lies within 
neoclassical realism (NCR). NCR distinguishes itself from neorealism by including unit-level 
characteristics and abandoning some neo-realist claims that IR theory is separate from a 
theory of foreign policy. NCR gives systemic-level factors primary weight but argues that 
states and states’ characteristics are transmission belts through which external imperatives 
are acted on in states’ foreign policies.37 NCR includes perceptions,38 states’ motives,39 
nationalism and ideology,40 and domestic institutions.41 In general, NCR “foreign policy 
analysis stresses that foreign policy decisions are made by human beings, political leaders and 
elites”.42  
NCR’s incorporation of domestic and decision-making factors is, however, different 
from regime security approaches. Whereas regime security work treats domestic and 
decision-making factors as independent variables alongside systemic stimuli, the domestic in 
NCR are intervening variables. Salloukh, for example, develops a first-cut theory of NCR to 
examine Syria and Jordan’s alignment decisions.43 While structural factors are paramount in 
explaining alliance choices, Salloukh argues that state formation processes influence regimes’ 
responses to systemic pressures. Juneau also develops a NCR variant to explore causes of 
Iran’s deviation from “realist” foreign policy. Domestic factors — including status, identity, 
and factional politics — play intervening roles leading Iran’s foreign policy to depart from 
otherwise “optimal” performance. Juneau argues that structural power distribution shapes 
possible foreign policy options and domestic intervening variables determine which foreign 
policy decision is taken.44 Incorporating domestic factors, these realist adaptations to the 
Middle East relate to FPA research in many ways. Nevertheless, an FPA perspective would 
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challenge these approaches and critique them for their underdevelopment of domestic and 
decision-making factors from three angles.  
 First, although IRME scholars have dismissed neorealism for black-boxing the state, the 
regime security approach presents the “regime” as an abstract concept, where the decision-
making unit is a catch-all for all regime types. As Ryan argues, “all Arab regimes are 
comparable, as all can be described as authoritarian or semi-authoritarian security-states, 
whether they are led by a president, king, sultan, or emir”.45 With authoritarian regimes 
placed in one category, little room is left for factors at bureaucratic, small groups, and 
individual levels affecting the decision-making process. FPA scholarship argues that non-
democracies are far from uniform46 and explores how variation in authoritarian states 
influences foreign policy processes and outcomes.47 
 FPA research on non-democracies and the regime security approach are alike in 
challenging the assumption that authoritarian leaders and governments are unaccountable 
to and unconstrained by societal pressures.48 Yet the regime security approach and its regime 
survival logic often fail to explain how leaders take foreign policy decisions that ignore 
domestic public opinion. Al-Assad’s decision to ally with Iran against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988) and Sadat’s decision to pursue peace with Israel in 1979 are examples of 
unpopular foreign policy. Another example is Egyptian President Al-Sissi’s decision to hand 
control of the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to the Saudi kingdom in 2015, which sparked street 
protests and public controversy in Egypt. From an FPA perspective, the relationship between 
foreign policy and the public is not straightforward. Whereas some research supports the 
proposition that publics constrain foreign policy even in authoritarian regimes,49 other 
research challenges this, noting leaders’ frequent decisions that are counter to public opinion 
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and the ability for the media and leaders to manipulate public views.50 By problematizing the 
domestic political processes in authoritarian regimes, an FPA perspective would provide the 
regime security approach with further depth and rigour in analysing regimes vis-à-vis their 
domestic and institutional environments. 
Second, regime security work conflates leadership and regime security. Leadership 
security means that those particular personalities who are in power remain so. Regime 
security is broader, for leaders may be overthrown, but if the dominant coalition and system 
of rule remain, the regime is intact. This analytical problem became more relevant during the 
Arab uprisings, as heads of states changed but regime structures in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen 
endured. This issue is related to FPA debates over whether, how, and under which 
circumstances, a change of leadership affects foreign policy.51 FPA research on coalitions, 
institutions, and elites in authoritarian regimes can be helpful for disentangling leaders from 
regimes. Work on bureaucratic politics, for example, explores relationships between 
coalitions within the regime and leaders as cue-takers and brokers.52 Work on decision units 
suggests that coalitions and the locus of authority for making foreign policy are fluid, even 
within the same regime.53 Finally, the vast research on the importance of individual leaders’ 
beliefs, perceptions, and personalities for foreign policy leads us to expect that changes in 
leaders are critical to foreign policy even without regime change.54 
Third, an FPA perspective would also challenge regime security and NCR’s assumptions 
about how domestic politics influences executives. FPA research demonstrates that leaders 
cannot always adopt “a view from above” domestic pressures. The same applies to 
international constraints; leaders may not be constantly “driven by international pressures” 
as Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell argue.55  FPA, including polihereustic theory,56 offers more 
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complex perspectives on relationships between international and domestic spheres and 
executives than is seen in much regime security and NCR work.  
The role of perceptions and beliefs in NCR research is underdeveloped, from an FPA 
perspective. The psychological approach has arguably become dominant in FPA,57 focusing on 
a variety of (related) psychological sources, including leadership styles, beliefs, images, 
cognitive frames, personality traits, analogies, errors and biases in information processing, 
threat perception, and small group dynamics. Middle East scholars have questioned the 
psychological school’s validity in explaining foreign policy behavior in the region, considering 
it to be “reductionist”.58 Yet leaders, such as Saddam Hussein and Gamal Abdel Nasser, show 
that personality and beliefs play a major role in IRME and indeed, some work has found 
psychological factors to can be crucial in explaining Middle East foreign policy behavior.59 
FPA’s psychological research can provide IRME scholarship with considerable theoretical and 
empirical grounding and explanatory leverage,60 and is a missing aspect of IRME’s orientation 
toward domestic factors.61 
Constructivism 
Constructivist research also underscores the importance of domestic politics in 
international politics. While some constructivist work operates at the system level, with a 
focus on shared norms and general social construction of international politics,62 other 
constructivists go inside states, engaging with ideational and normative factors at societal 
levels. Constructivist research, for example, points to the importance of discourse, ideas, 
identity and roles  in alternative explanations to interest-based and material explanations of 
foreign policies.63 The politics of identity, operating at supranational, national, and sub-state 
levels, render the Middle East an optimal pool for constructivism and constructivism has 
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generated refreshing interpretations of IRME that take into account regional particularities 
without lapsing into culturally-reductionist arguments. 
Constructivist studies of IRME explore the impact of changing norms, public sphere 
deliberations, and identity on foreign policy.64 Although some scholars consider the factors 
shaping identities at interstate levels,65 others have look to the domestic level as the main 
source of state identities.66 Identities can shape a society’s internal politics and, hence, co-
constitute its foreign interests. For instance, Lynch67 links inconsistencies in Jordanian foreign 
policy over time with public struggles over identity. Similarly, Barnett68 argues that state 
identities often influence foreign policy through legitimizing the course of action while making 
other choices “unthinkable”. Elsewhere, Barnett69 shows that change in national identity 
narratives in Egypt from pan-Arabism to Egyptian nationalism made the peace process with 
Israel plausible.  
Many scholars argue that the link between constructivism and FPA is natural, 
considering constructivists’ conceptions of agency and ideas. As Smith70 notes, “social 
construction and foreign policy analysis look made for one another”.71 Checkel posits that 
constructivists share with FPA scholars “a strong focus on agency”, but contends that 
constructivism is not “simply warmed over FPA”, since constructivism often stems from a 
more interpretivist branch and focuses on mutual co-constitution.72 Constructivists often 
view FPA as individualist, ultra-positivist, and asocial.73 Many FPA scholars, however, would 
challenge these labels of FPA research. Epistemologically, FPA is similar to “conventional”, 
“neoclassical” or “thin” constructivists who do not reject positivism.74 Furthermore, the 
central ontological role of subjectivity in FPA means FPA scholarship deviates from strict 
positivist epistemological assumptions of an objective reality. FPA research is also not as 
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asocial as some perceive. FPA’s conceptualisation of agency includes agent-other interactions 
and agent-agent social dynamics,75 and builds on insights from social psychology. A serious 
engagement between IRME and FPA is therefore possible and can fill several lacunae in 
research on identity politics in IRME. 
First, FPA research challenges constructivism for giving primacy to social structures 
over agency. Flanik,76 notes that “constructivists endorse co-constitution in principle, but in 
practice, much constructivist works favour structure”. Agency in an FPA perspective, on the 
other hand, is foundational. FPA research not only examines micro-foundations of agent’s 
relationships to structure, it allows for varying perceptions of, instrumental uses of, and 
responses to structures. Similarly, Middle East scholars have often criticized constructivism 
for disavowing “the role of the domestic environment in mediating the interplay between 
norms (coming from outside via the state) and identity (emanating from the society)”.77 Many 
Middle East scholars have made similar criticisms to the constructivist characterization of 
identity politics in the region. Despite the initial appeal of constructivism to include agency, 
constructivist scholars focus mostly on structures and hardly unpack processes through which 
identities change and do not address why some identities among others become salient in 
the foreign policy making.78 
Second, from an FPA perspective, constructivism also overlooks processes of social 
construction79 and does not include ideational factors in individuals’ belief systems and how 
these transfer to collective levels.80 Constructivists also tend to assume a seamless match 
between culture at the societal level and policymaking at the elite level. For example, studies 
of identities take for granted that elites and masses share a single national identity.81 When 
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constructivist research allows differences between elites and masses, the assumption is often 
that culture and identity are powerful enough to constrain elites.82  
The Middle East provides countless examples supporting FPA’s criticism of 
constructivist views of the domestic sphere. Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad, for example, 
needed to appeal to ruling coalitions and masses in framing regime identity — consensus was 
not automatic. Moreover, competitions among groups within their constituencies were 
crucial in framing collective identity and its influence on foreign policy. Also, the pan-Arab 
dimension driving Jordanian foreign policy has been partly shaped by the Palestinian-
Transjordanian social divide.83 Israel presents other examples of foreign policies shaped by 
domestic identity tensions of Jews versus non-Jews and Israelis versus Arabs.84 Moreover, the 
role of public opinion in the foreign policies of Arab states85 challenges the constructivist 
assumption that policymakers and masses share a similar meaning of state identity, yet 
empirical analyses demonstrate that Arab elites and societies may hold separate identities. 
Valbjørn and Bank show how Jordanian, Egyptian, and Saudi societies exhibited an Arabism 
reflecting a regime-society divide that constrained their foreign policies during the 2006 
Lebanon War and the 2009 Gaza War.86 Similarly, although elites in Syria, Egypt, Yemen, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia wanted to recognize and develop a relationship with Israel, they 
were constrained by public opposition.87 
FPA would challenge constructivist scholars for assuming uncontested identities or 
that identities only function to constrain elites. FPA scholarship suggests that when identities 
are contested, elites may frame and manipulate public opinion or even operate fairly free of 
the public and against mass-level identities and values.88 FPA research offers insights about 
how norm, identity, and role contestation affects both the policymaking process and resulting 
 16 
 
foreign policy behaviour.89 Overall, FPA challenges constructivist assumptions that social 
structures powerfully constraint agents.  In this way, FPA offers a complementary but distinct 
perspective on the role of ideas in international relations and on the relationship between 
agents and structures. 
Third, FPA would challenge some constructivist-oriented role theory research within 
IRME. Roles are “repertoires of behaviour, emanating from one’s own conceptions and 
others’ expectations , selected in reaction to cues and demands”90 and role theoretical 
approaches emphasise roles as social positions states take in international society.91 A small 
number of scholars have adopted constructivist role theory in the study of ideational factors 
in IRME. Ovah, for example, uses role theory to explain change in Turkish foreign policy 
following the AKP’s rise to power.92 Barnett examines role conflict and institutions in Arab 
politics. He shows membership in several institutions (sovereignty and Arabism) created role 
conflict and regional instability.93 Although some role theory work in IRME recognises the 
importance of domestic sources and constraints on roles, most of it, similar to constructivist 
research on identities, assumes more consensus or societal constraint within the state than 
would an FPA approach to roles. An FPA approach more specifically develops, with middle-
range FPA research, the domestic political and even psychological mechanisms of 
contestation over national roles.94 
AN FPA PERSPECTIVE OF IRME 
FPA can do more than challenge the way domestic politics is approached in IRME work, it can 
guide research into new directions. In this concluding section, we discuss specific ways future 
research can integrate FPA ideas into IRME scholarship. We offer four avenues for research 
— an understanding of public opinion’s influence based on the distribution of information, 
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the decision unit framework, leadership style, and role theory. Our suggestions draw from 
established FPA research areas and offer considerable potential benefits for both FPA and 
IRME. We conclude with a more general perspective as a distinct standpoint from which FPA 
can approach IRME. 
 If IRME work is going to take seriously public influence on foreign policy, how can it 
approach this complicated relationship? FPA offers no easy answers and includes a variety of 
intervening factors between a bottom-up perspective that sees public opinion as very 
important to a top-down perspective in which publics follow elites.95 Baum and Potter’s 
framework is particularly attractive as it integrates and explains a number of findings on the 
role of public opinion in foreign policy. They focus on information held by elites and available 
to the public, with a key role played by the media. They characterize the dynamic relationship 
between the public, the media, and decision makers “as a marketplace in which the relative 
distribution of information among these three actors in large part determines their relative 
influence on foreign policy”. In early stages of a policy or response to an international event, 
governments enjoy an information advantage. As time goes by, there is more “opportunity 
for the public to accumulate sufficient information to overcome — or at least reduce — its 
informational disadvantage”.96 Although based largely on research on democracies, the 
model’s general principles may apply to other countries,97 including Middle East states. The 
model’s relevance to IRME may be more significant with the increasing role of media outlets, 
including social media, in Middle East politics.98 While elites’ information advantage may be 
greater in the Middle East, compared to other regions and regime types, the basic idea that 
publics have more information about foreign policy at some points in time and that changing 
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distributions of information affect the role the public plays in foreign policy are plausible. The 
model’s relevance to the IRME is at least an empirical question, worthy of investigation. 
 The decision units framework is another FPA approach that can be useful for 
examining domestic political divisions within regimes.99 The framework identifies three types 
of decisions units — actors with authority to commit regime’s resources in foreign policy — 
that commonly occur across and within regimes, in democracies and non-democracies: 1) 
predominant leaders (single individuals holding authority to commit regime resources); 2) 
single groups (a small number of people collectively make foreign policy decisions); and 3) 
coalitions (autonomous political actors among which a subset need to agree to foreign policy). 
Decision units can change across a single policy and across time. The framework acts as a 
theory-selector — different decision units and different key characteristics of those units 
point analysts to middle-range theories (e.g., bureaucratic politics, groupthink, or coalition 
formation). The decision units framework has the advantage of integrating several strands of 
research in its approach to opening the black box of foreign policy decision making. 
 Another avenue of promising research for IRME would incorporate FPA work on 
leaders’ beliefs and personalities. Leaders have incredible potential to impact foreign policy, 
in both democracies and authoritarian states. As Hermann and Hagan argue, “state leaders 
play a pivotal role in balancing international imperatives with those arising from, or 
embedded in, domestic politics”.100 Leaders shape intentions and strategies of their states 
and are themselves an important part of their countries’ diplomatic capabilities.101 FPA 
research includes a number of ways leaders shape foreign policy, including leaders’ beliefs 
about the nature of the political universe, how leaders represent foreign policy problems and 
define international situations, leaders’ orientations toward risk, various pathologies and 
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neuroses in leaders’ psyches, leaders’ cognitive biases, motivations, and perceptions, and 
leaders’ images of other countries.  
Research on leaders’ personalities is another fruitful approach within FPA.  Personality 
can be defined as a patterned relationship among cognition, affect, motivations and 
orientations toward interpersonal relationships.102 Personalities are a critical sources of “the 
heterogeneity of preferences, beliefs and decision-making processes” that are significant in 
international politics.103 FPA work on Leadership Trait Analysis — a composite, or multi-factor 
approach, incorporating beliefs, traits, and style — has demonstrated the importance of 
personality in international relations in a number of different contexts.104 Leadership Trait 
Analysis is useful for investigating agent-structure relations, with its focus on which leaders 
challenge constraints and which respect them.105 Leadership Trait Analysis utilises a reliable, 
systematic, and comparative method for assessing personalities through a computerized 
content analysis of leader discourse.106 Given the centralized nature of foreign policy making 
in Middle Eastern states, leaders and their personalities is a critical gap in current IRME 
research. 
A fourth area of FPA research that is particularly promising for IRME is recent work on 
role theory. Role theory offers a conceptual framework of internal, external, material, and 
ideational dimensions of states’ social positions. First imported to IR from Sociology by 
Holsti,107 role theory research has recently flourished.108 Role theory is rich conceptually, 
theoretically and ontologically as it integrates various concepts (e.g. identities, cognitions, 
expectations, and socialisation) imperative for understanding IR and foreign policy. It provides 
a conceptual tool-kit for unravelling complex social processes, and operates at multiple levels 
of analysis, bridging agents and structures; many scholars have considered this as one of its 
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distinct strengths.109 Recent role theory work incorporates internal contestation over national 
roles, connecting roles to well-researched domestic political dynamics.110 Role theory can 
inform the study of ideational factors in the Middle East in many ways. Revolutions, regime 
changes, and leadership change can shift role conceptions. Moreover, the rise of small states 
in the Persian Gulf and their attempt to influence regional politics reveals interactive 
dynamics of roles at the international level and agent-structure relations, which are central 
to role theory.111 The promise and value of role theory in the study of IRME is illustrated 
through work using Middle East cases to develop role theory. These have also provided 
insights on well-researched IRME cases, such as US-Iranian and US-Israeli relations.112 
Conclusion  
IRME has traditionally acknowledged the centrality of domestic factors long before the 
attention to domestic politics and decision making in IR theories. Yet, FPA is scarcely used in 
examining foreign policy behaviour in the region. Instead, ME scholars often opt for eclectic 
approaches that combine structural and domestic levels of analyses. This article showed that 
FPA can offer a distinct standpoint from which to analyse IRME. An FPA perspective proposes 
that central decision-making units (leaders) subjectively interpret domestic and international 
constraints and opportunities affect foreign policy. As an alternative approach, FPA 
foregrounds decisionmakers, whose interpretations of their political environments is 
conditioned by material, ideational, psychological, societal, and institutional factors. An FPA 
perspective integrates these through agents’ psychological experience. This is a contextualist, 
not a reductionist argument as other levels of analysis are included.113 As Bueno de Mesquita 
argues, “when we examine international affairs through the lens of domestic decision making 
we provide a way to think about how properties of the international system are shaped by 
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local considerations as part of the larger strategic fabric of politics”.114  As a multilevel 
approach that combines ideational and material factors, an FPA perspective is ontologically 
rich in its integration of decision making and domestic politics.  
FPA thus stands in a unique and strong position to inform the domestic political 
orientation in IRME scholarship as the field seeks to integrate with IR theory. As Middle East 
scholars face challenges to increase the relevance of their work to the IR discipline at large, 
FPA can help Middle East scholarship contribute to theoretical debates beyond the region. By 
integrating domestic and systemic factors through the psychological experience of agents, 
FPA provides an eclectic framework that allows for the particularities of the region while 
maintaining a coherent theoretical perspective conducive to cross-regional comparisons.  A 
stronger connection between FPA and IRME scholarship would also be positive for FPA.  
Despite its long-standing commitment to comparative work, FPA remains parochially focused 
on the United States.  Hudson and Brummer specifically call for deeper engagement between 
‘mainstream’ FPA research and FPA scholarship beyond North America, arguing that this is 
critical for FPA’s theoretical development.115 Although this article has focused on reasons that 
IRME should incorporate work from FPA, future work in this area holds considerable promise 
for mutual benefits. 
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